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is found to exist against the component part manufacturer, Lambert and
Hector Supply may be rendered nugatory, and would allow purchasers
a right of recovery against the previously non-liable retailer. In so doing
balance will be added to the law of implied warranty in Florida.
STANLEY L. LESTER
RESCISSION OF CONTRACTS-U NI LATERAL MISTAKE
IN FLORIDA
The defendant-insurance company gave a check to the plaintiff in
exchange for a release, following an automobile accident between the
plaintiff and the defendant's insured. After this transaction the defendant
learned that its insured had allowed its policy to lapse, and that it was not
in force at the time of the accident. Therefore, the defendant returned
the release to the plaintiff and stopped payment on its check. In this suit
on the check, the defendant raised two defenses. First, that there was no
consideration for the check. This defense was held to be without merit.
The second defense was that the company was entitled to cancel the
transaction because of its unilateral mistake of fact. On the plaintiff's
motion for summary judgment, the lower court held for the defendant-
insurance company. On appeal, held, reversed: unilateral mistake is not
a ground for equitable relief in Florida. Krasnek v. Maryland Cas. Co.,
158 So.2d 580 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
Florida's law with respect to unilateral mistake of fact is rather
confused.' Cases concerned with such mistakes have occurred in three
areas: cancellation of deeds, rescission of contracts, and rescission of
bids. Since Florida courts have disregarded the factual distinctions be-
tween these types of cases, this paper will treat them together in chrono-
logical order.
The leading case on this subject in Florida is Crosby v. Andrews,2
wherein it was held that a deed may be rescinded for a negligently made
unilateral mistake of fact, where the negligence is not a breach of legal
duty;" the mistake is material; and it is inequitable for the other party to
benefit from the error.
1. The confusion is not confined to the state of Florida. "The law of mistake as it
actually works, as it is demonstrated in decisions, is not capable of being reduced to any
broad single doctrine." 3 CORBIN, CONTRACTS 672 (1960).
2. 61 Fla. 554, 55 So. 57 (1911).
3. Concerning the negligence that caused the mistake in Crosby, Justice Shackleford,
in his dissent, said:
The alleged mistake would clearly seem to be not only unilateral, but entirely
due to the culpable negligence and inexcusable carelessness of the complainants.
If any one of them had only taken the necessary time and trouble to read the
deed before executing it, the mistake . . . would have been at once discovered.
All the facts were within reach of the complainants, and they had but to open
CASES NOTED
Sixteen years later, the Crosby rule was followed in the rescinding
of another deed, even though it was recognized that in most states,
rescission would not be permitted:
In 4 Ruling Case Law, p. 506, it is said: ... "Although it has
been held that relief by way of cancellation will be granted for
unilateral mistake of fact even though it be due to the neg-
ligence of the complainant, so long as the lack of due care on the
latter's part does not amount to the breach of a legal duty, the
authorities are practically unanimous in holding that the mis-
take must not result from the want of that degree of care and
diligence which would be exercised by persons of reasonable
prudence under the same circumstances ....
One year later, the Florida Supreme Court permitted rescission of
a contract because of a unilateral mistake. This was apparently a case
of first impression in Florida, since the court relied on cases from other
states for the following proposition:
In the absence of fraud, relief will be granted in equity on the
ground of unilateral mistake, where the mistaken party offers
to put the other party in satus quo [sic] ; the theory being that
the minds of the parties have never met in consummation of a
trade under the actual existing conditions.'
This case was the basis of an annotation wherein it is stated that as
a general rule, equity will grant relief from a unilateral mistake of fact
by rescission of the contract when:
(1) the mistake relates to a material feature of the contract,
(2) the parties can be put in status quo,
(3) enforcement of the contract would be unconscionable,
(4) the mistake was not negligently made.6
The annotation mentions Florida's Crosby decision as an exception to
the general rule which denies relief in the case of a negligent mistake.'
Crosby was relied on again to allow cancellation of a satisfaction
of a mortgage, which had been given in the mistaken belief that the
mortgage had been fully paid for. The Florida Supreme Court said:
their eyes to see -them. Could grosser carelessness or more culpable negligence
be well imagined? Crosby v. Andrews, 61 Fla. 554, 585, 55 So. 57, 67 (1911).
The negligence in the instant case was no greater, and yet, relief was denied.
4. Langley v. Irons Land & Dev. Co., 94 Fla. 1010, 1018, 114 So. 769, 771 (1927).
Today, this case seems to stand only for the proposition that a mistake, based upon a
misrepresentation by the other party, will be relieved against. E.g., Peace River Phosphate
Mining Co. v. Thomas A. Green, Inc., 102 Fla. 370, 135 So. 828 (1931). A careful study
of Langley, however, would seem to indicate that its holding is as broad as the holding
in Crosby.
5. Hurst v. National Bond & Inv. Co., 96 Fla. 148, 150, 117 So. 792 (1928).
6. Annot., 59 A.L.R. 809 (1929).
7. Id. at 822.
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We are conscious of the rule that a mistake arising solely from
the complaining party's negligence will not be relieved against
in a court of equity, but this rule is qualified by the doctrine
that the mistake must be wholly caused by the want of that care
and diligence in the transaction which should be used by every
person of reasonable prudence, and the absence of which would
be a violation of legal duty . ...
After this decision, Florida began to recede from its position in
Crosby. In a series of five cases, all but the first refused to allow rescission
for unilateral mistakes, and yet, Crosby was never expressly overruled.
Instead, it simply withered, as the general rule crept into opinions, some-
times disguised as dicta, sometimes as public policy, and sometimes as a
new rule restricting the granting of rescission.
The first of these cases was Moore v. Wesley E. Garrison, Inc.,'
where a tax deed was cancelled because of an error in the legal descrip-
tion of the property. The mistake was not made by one of the parties to
the suit, as in previous cases, but by a public official. The facts clearly
called for equitable relief, and it was granted, based upon the precedents
already discussed. Then, in dictum, the court alluded to an encyclopedia's
reference to the general rule denying rescission for negligent unilateral
mistakes. This general rule was copied into the opinion,'" and conse-
quently, appeared in a headnote to the case. From this inconspicuous be-
ginning arose the present confusion in the area with which this article is
concerned.
In the next case, Robertson v. Capital Fin. Corp.," cancellation of
a deed was denied, and Moore was among the cases cited as precedent.
The grantor thought his deed conveyed only twenty feet, while in reality
it conveyed much more. The court refused to follow the Florida prece-
dents for cancelling a deed in such circumstances, because the plaintiff
had failed to point out exactly which twenty feet he believed he was con-
veying. Thus, specificity became a new requirement for relief from a
negligently made unilateral mistake.
Robertson was followed by Johnson v. Green,'" which denied can-
cellation because the plaintiff was held to have ratified the contract after
discovering his error, and because he had an adequate remedy at law.
Whether or not the mistake was negligently made was not a factor in the
decision.
8. Chappell v. Nalle, 119 Fla. 711, 714, 160 So. 867, 868 (1935).
9. 148 Fla. 653, 5 So.2d 259 (1942). The instant case cites this as precedent for the
general rule in Florida.
10. 'Id. at 661, 5 So.2d at 262.
11. 40 So.2d 771 (Fla. 1949).
12. 54 So.2d 44 (Fla. 1951). The instant case relied on this decision as precedent
for the rule that negligent unilateral mistakes will not be relieved against in Florida.
CASES NOTED
Public policy was the major factor in Graham v. Clyde,13 the next
case that denied rescission. This was the first of a series of cases involving
public bids. In Graham, because of an error in manipulating his adding
machine, a contractor submitted a bid lower than the one intended. The
court said: "If the relief prayed for in this case is granted, then any
clerical error, or error in calculation can be relieved against. We do not
think this is the law. Unilateral errors are not generally relieved
against."' 4 As authority for this proposition, the court cited Crosby
(which, however, held that the opposite was true) 5 The only way that
the Graham decision can be rationalized is on the public policy principle
that contractors should be held to a high degree of care in cases of public
bidding. Also, the court noted, the plaintiff had failed to allege that his
mistake concerned a material fact. Nevertheless, this decision represents
a clear refusal of the court to relieve against a negligent unilateral mis-
take, in spite of compelling precedent to the contrary.
The next case 6 in the trend away from Crosby denied rescission for
two reasons. The first reason was that the plaintiff had waived his right
to equitable relief by not alleging that he had promptly acted to set the
contract aside after learning of his error. The second reason was based
on the dictum in Moore,7 which, as already pointed out, was not the
Florida rule, but nevertheless, was unfortunately included in the opinion.
At this point, just as the Crosby rule seemed to be totally eclipsed,
the Florida Supreme Court, in Wicker v. Board of Pub. Instruction of
Dade County,"8 which is a perfect parallel to the instant case, breathed
new life into Crosby. A deed had been given in exchange for a prejudicial
dismissal of two suits against the grantor (in the instant case, it was a
check in exchange for a release), but because the grantor had failed to
check the public records, he gave away more than he had intended. It
was alleged that the transaction was made without adequate consideration
and under a unilateral mistake of fact. These were the same points that
were raised by the defendant in the instant case, but the results were
quite different. In Wicker, despite the plaintiff's obvious negligence,
rescission was granted in accordance with Florida's traditional position. 9
Unfortunately, this case never has been, and probably never will be,
used as a precedent. It is dead and buried-its tombstone reads, "Schools
and School Districts Q- 65."
After this decision, the only cases concerning unilateral mistakes
13. 61 So.2d 656 (Fla. 1952).
14. Id. at 658.
15. See note 2 supra and accompanying text.
16. Rood Co. v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 102 So.2d 139 (Fla. 1958).
17. See text accompanying note 9 supra.
18. 106 So.2d 550 (Fla. 1958).
19. See discussion in text following note 2 supra.
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have been decided by Florida's district courts of appeal. The First District
has decided two cases dealing with errors in public bidding. The first of
these expanded the rule in the Graham case and declared that such bids
should be considered irrevocable because of public policy.2" In the second
case," decided a year later, the same court receded from its earlier
opinion and expressed dissatisfaction with the rule in Graham (which was
a difficult case to accept in the first place). Thus, in the First District at
least, relief will still be afforded for unilateral mistakes, even when
negligently made.
The Second District seems to be floundering in the sea of confused
rules that make up the law of mistake. In O'Neill v. Broadview, Inc.,22
the court looked outside of Florida for a rule to apply, and refused to
grant rescission of a contract to buy a house when the mistake complained
of related to the direction that the house would face when completed. In
a later case, 5 the court refused to cancel a deed when the mistake alleged
was that the grantor did not think she was selling as much land as the
deed conveyed. The decision stressed the fact that the land was sold in
bulk with no mention of quantity being the essence of the contract. How-
ever, the court quoted from Graham to the effect that negligence was a
bar to relief. 4
The Third District has taken no firm stand on the issue, for while
it has granted relief from a general release of liability because of a mis-
take of fact,25 it denied that such a remedy existed in the instant case.
Thus, on the issue of unilateral mistake, Florida's courts are lined
up as follows:
Supreme Court: for rescission
First District: for rescission
Second District: against rescission
Third District: for and against rescission
With the law in such a confused state, it is not surprising that the
court in the instant case reached the wrong conclusion. The court's state-
ment that unilateral mistake is not a ground for relief in Florida was
20. Hotel China & Glass Co. v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 130 So.2d 78 (Fla. 1st
Dist. 1961).
21. State Bd. of Control v. Clutter Constr. Corp., 139 So.2d 153 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1962).
22. 112 So.2d 280 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1959). It is primarily upon this case that the
decision in the instant case is based.
23. Bridges v. Thomas, 118 So.2d 549 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1960).
24. "If one's mistake is due to his own negligence and lack of foresight and caution,
in the absence of fraud or imposition, equity will not grant relief." Id. at 553. When
decisions like this one are contrasted with Crosby (see text accompanying note 3 supra),
the shift in the Florida position appears most dramatic.
25. Ormsby v. Ginolfi, 105 So.2d 272 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1958).
CASES NOTED
based upon the O'Neill case.2 O'Neill, however, was based upon a legal
encyclopedia and not upon Florida law.
The court also cited the Moore 7 and Johnson8 cases, and was mis-
led by the fact that the general rule denying relief for negligent mistakes
has been allowed to entrench itself in our case law, in spite of the several
decisions by the Florida Supreme Court which grant relief from negligent
mistakes.
The court's decision was an unfortunate one since all of the elements
of rescission were present. The parties had been put in status quo; the
mistake related to a material matter; retention of the money by the plain-
tiff was unconscionable. Although the defendant's mistake was due to its
negligence, that should have been no bar to relief in Florida.29
Had the defendant brought an action for restitution of the payment,
perhaps the result would have been different." Instead, it chose to do
nothing until it had to defend itself in a suit on the check.
There seems to be sufficient conflict in this area among the districts
for the supreme court to once again deal with the issue. A strong pro-
nouncement as to exactly what the law in Florida is, with respect to
unilateral mistakes, would be most welcome.
WARREN M. SALOMON
26. O'Neill v. Broadview, Inc., supra note 22.
27. Moore v. Wesley E. Garrison, Inc., supra note 9.
28. Johnson v. Green, supra note 12.
29. See note 19 supra and accompanying text.
30. The court in the instant case said: "[W]e are not here concerned with a suit
for restitution upon equitable principles. In such an action the determinative issue might
well be whether after the receipt of the payment, circumstances so changed as to make
it inequitable to require the payee to make full restitution." Krasnek v. Maryland Cas. Co.,
158 So.2d 580, 582 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
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